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ABSTRACT

This report of a study of the activities of a secret planning board, formed to promote the nomination of Dwight Eisenhower through the intensive use of television, concludes that the significance of television planning in the 1952 Eisenhower campaign had less to do with the outcome of the election than with the first massive use of television with politics on a national stage. A discussion of the formation and strategies of the nine-man planning board makes up the major portion of the paper, while the remainder of the report focuses on the role of the Republican National Committee in utilizing the media to accentuate the "warmth of personality" of both Eisenhower and vice-presidental candidate Richard Nixon. (AEA)

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Television Planning in the 1952 Eisenhower Campaign

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Introduction

The 1952 presidential campaign marked the first time television was broadly implemented in an American political campaign.[1] With a sense of historic change, television executives approached the campaign believing that their medium would revolutionize the political process. Sig Mickelson, who was director of news and public affairs for CBS at the time, recalls:

> We were absolutely euphoric about what television was going to do to the whole political process. . . . We went into that campaign of 1952 convinced that we had the most magnificient new device that had ever been created, a device that would bring politics literally into the living room, a device that would make candidates become real human beings--much more than just cold characters in print or on the radio.[2]

Political operatives in both parties also were sensitive to the importance of the broadcast media in 1952, but the Republican campaign of Dwight Eisenhower was from the beginning more conscious of television.

In examining the campaign, scholars have directed attention to the Republican convention in Chicago, at which General Eisenhower accepted his party's nomination before an estimated 4,447,000 homes tuned to the proceedings on television.[3] The medium itself became an issue at Chicago when the effort by Robert A. Taft loyalists to "lock out" television cameras became a rallying point for Eisenhower supporters.[4] Beyond the convention, studies of the role of television in the 1952 campaign have focused on the uses of broadcast messages in advertising and public relations, and the impact of those messages on voting behavior.[5] In the 1952 campaign, Republicans spent approximately $3.5 million for radio and television, of which $2.1 million went for network time. (The Democratic campaign of Adlai E. Stevenson spent $2.5 million for radio and television, $1.5 million for network time.)[6]

The overt selling of the candidate through the broadcast media, was, however, one of several elements in the Republicans' 1952 marriage of politics and broadcasting. Documents at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, reveal an extensive effort, much of it secret, to utilize television in the campaign and to structure the campaign's news flow for the requisites of the new electronic media. The present study concentrates on the activities of a secret television planning board made up of broadcasting professionals. The existence of that group has remained undisclosed for almost thirty years.

The TV Plans Board

Eisenhower's campaign advisors recognized the enormous potential of television, but were equally wary of its misuse. Less than a week after receiving the Republican Party's presidential nomination, Eisenhower was advised to make television the central element in the 1952 campaign. The suggestion came from Sigurd Larmon, president of Young & Rubicam, one of several advertising agencies which became active in the Eisenhower campaign.[7] In a letter to the candidate, Larmon said the utilization of media in the campaign called for

> the same careful planning and strategy as you and your staff employed in setting up the invasion of Normandy, and the same careful planning that we, in our business, employ in order to insure the successful introduction of a new product.[8]

Larmon urged Eisenhower to refrain from a "barnstorming" campaign, for large and frequent rallies no longer had the same appeal in an age of television. "Now the successful advent of television," he said, "must . . . influence the planning of the campaign":

> Television, with its triple advantages of sight, sound and motion, can make or break a candidate, a party or a platform. Correctly used, it can be a tremendous asset. Improperly used, it can be a devastating boomerang . . . . In my opinion, television, plus radio, should be the keystone of your public communications plan. They must not be considered as supplementary media, but as the heart of your program to 'win friends and influence people.[9]

Larmon noted that there were 18,000,000 television homes and 43,000,000 radio homes in America. He recommended that "the most effective use of television and radio should be planned immediately."[10]

Eisenhower's inner circle of advisors was well ahead of Larmon. Planning the role television would play in an Eisenhower campaign began seven months earlier, in December of 1951, while Eisenhower was NATO Commander in Paris, claiming that politics was a pretty "sordid" business and that he had no intention of initiating a run for the presidency.[11]

On December 17, 1951, a confidential meeting of a group which called itself the "TV Plans Board" was held at the Commodore Hotel in New York City. The group was under the supervision of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, who led the effort to induce Eisenhower to run and, on January 7, 1952, announced at a press conference that the General had allowed his name to be entered in the New Hampshire primary as a Republican.

The TV Plans Board was composed of nine men with connections to the broadcast industry; five of them were employed by NBC. Together, they formed a quasi-industry unit which they labeled "Ike-TV, a TV Network In Miniature."[12] Halsey V. Barrett had been advertising and promotion manager of CBS-TV in Washington and New York, and head of stations for the Dumont network. In December 1951, he was Eastern sales manager of Consolidated TV Programs, Inc.; Jack Burns had been a newscaster and

was an NBC-TV executive trainee; David Crandall had served as head of programming for CBS-TV in Los Angeles and San Francisco. At the time of the meeting, he was a producer-director for NBC.

Murray Gross was described in the minutes of the meeting as "a press representative who understands how to compute TV's cost-per-thousand."[13] His experience included jobs with the New York Sun and Television magazine. Lewis Marcy had been radio news editor for UPI and was head of sales planning for NBC. George Ogie and another member of the board were network account executives for NBC.[14] Robert Shawley was a veteran actor in TV productions, and was then starring in "Stalag 17" on Broadway. Thomas Wright, who had worked in Thomas E. Dewey's 1948 presidential campaign, was television director of the Dundees and Frank advertising agency.

The group was formed when several of its members approached officials of the New York State Republican Committee with a pamphlet they had prepared called "One Billion Doorbells." Television, the document pointed out, could generate one billion positive Eisenhower impressions if used effectively during the course of a campaign. The pamphlet made specific suggestions for the use of television programming in the campaign. Henry Cabot Lodge then met with two or three of the television professionals, approved their efforts, and asked them to continue. Members of the TV Plans Board insisted that their anonymity be preserved.[15]

The board's meetings continued up to the November election. At the outset, its reports were sent to Lodge. By September 1952, they were addressed to New Hampshire Governor Sherman Adams, who was campaign chief of staff; Arthur Summerfield, the campaign director; and Walter Williams, chairman of Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon.

When the group was formed, Eisenhower trailed Taft in delegate strength by perhaps as many as 400 votes. (There were 1205 convention delegates, with 603 votes needed for the nomination.) The Plans Board defined its principal objective as presenting "methods to inject drama at a grass roots level into the Ike movement."[16] Its mission, which was considered advisory throughout the campaign, was described as follows:

> In a detached and professional manner and with commercial network techniques to:
> (1) Enlist members of the television industry in the Eisenhower movement.
> (2) Provide TV evaluation.
> (3) Create en masse pro-Eisenhower TV impressions.
> (4) Elicit mail replies from the public to gain names of potential petition canvassers.[17]

The petition movement was intended to be a dramatic display of public support for the Eisenhower candidacy. Given Taft's early delegate strength, the Ohio Republican's nomination was considered certain unless some kind of "dramatic Ike movement" could be engineered.[18]

The structured appeal for public support was mounted on newspaper, magazine, and broadcast fronts. A group of anti-Taft Republicans--Governor Dewey, Senators James A. Duff of Pennsylvania, Frank Carlson of Kansas, and Lodge of Massachusetts--had already launched a "Draft Eisenhower" movement. In fact, the effort was not entirely a draft, for Eisenhower had to come home from Europe in June to strengthen his cause by direct appeal.[19] Before that, however, Eisenhower's supporters staged a massive rally in Madison Square Garden.

Film of the rally showing 15,000 supporters chanting "We Like Ike!" was flown to Paris, where Eisenhower viewed it. James David Barber argues that this "media event tipped the balance" in persuading Eisenhower to

run.[20] In any event, the General was committed from the start, Barber says, to a campaign geared to the new demands of television:

> The rise of television broadcasting, with its emphasis on brevity and intimacy, was transforming the political dialogue from a discussion to a disjointed series of symbolic assertions . . . . Eisenhower, from a sense of duty, went along with what more experienced politicians told him was necessary.[21]

The secret TV Plans Board was involved in planning the Madison Square Garden rally, which was organized by Hollywood producer Leland Hayward and entertainer Tex McCrary. The rally was broadcast live in New York City on WNBC and WNBT. (As part of the festivities, McCrary's wife, actress Jinx Falkenburg, batted tennis balls at the audience. New York theater critics were unimpressed with the production, and Lodge conceded later that it was "very mediocre."[22])

The TV Board also arranged promotion and news coverage of the event. From the minutes of the group's meeting on January 7:

> TV Plans Board can:
> (1) See that effective 'on-the-air' promotion slides and copy give program full send-off by having promotion ready early.
> (2) Consider the advisability of kineing[kinescoping] show retelecast on as many stations as possible without paying time charges.
> (3) Arrange for 'news' coverage . . . Camel News Caravan and CBS News to pick up a couple of minutes as evidence of 'spontaneous Eisenhower effort . . .'
>
> [emphasis and quotes theirs][23]

The "spontaneity" to be observed at the rally would be carefully orchestrated, and the TV Plans Board was worried that any knowledge of its activities might become public. Even the advertising agency involved with the rally, Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborne, was unaware that a television planning group was the source of recommendations made to it:

> Apparently, for Eisenhower to exist as a candidate, the most aggressive action must occur between now

> and the convention end rather than after the convention. Contrary custom, this places the burden of decision upon the advertising agency before . . . the nomination. Thus, the TV Plans Board will recommend immediately specific 'agency action' to Senator Lodge and associates . . . and for effectiveness, it is obvious that the agency must not know of the existence of the Board. Henceforth, such recommendations for 'agency action' will be segregated and placed in CAPITAL LETTERS in these reports:
>
> MAKE CERTAIN THAT WNBT AND WNBC PREPARE AND USE ON-THE-AIR PROMOTION FOR GARDEN RALLY. 24

The major media event of the pre-nomination period was Eisenhower's return from Europe and his subsequent announcement of candidacy in Abilene. That the occasion had been in large measure created for the news media was transparent. Marquis Childs of the St. Louis Post Dispatch observed later that Eisenhower's second homecoming was "a ritual enacted for the press."[25] Elaborate materials were prepared for reporters covering the events over two days in Abilene, a town with a population of approximately 7,000. (For the major address, 2,600 stadium seats were reserved for VIP's.)[26]

On June 4, the General took part in the laying of the cornerstone for the Eisenhower Museum. The ceremony was followed by a parade depicting the life of Eisenhower, and then his major address late in the afternoon. The next morning, he held a press conference at an Abilene theater. A courier rushed film to Kansas City after the cornerstone laying, the speech, and the press conference.[27]

As was the case with the Madison Square Garden rally, the TV Plans Board had a role in planning the announcement in Abilene. The group had suggested to Lodge in April that everything possible be done to have the speech televised live:

> Film reports . . . fall far short of being effective when presenting newsworthy items (film of course should be used to do a supplementary job for newsreels,

> etc.). But if Ike's words are to be 'burned into the minds of America,' they must be televised 'live' instantaneously to the audience.28

And so they were, marking the first live transmission of a presidential candidate's announcement speech. In The Powers That Be, Halberstam implies that the decision to broadcast live also had a good deal to do with CBS Board Chairman William S. Paley's personal interest in the candidate.[29] Laying cable to Abilene was an expensive proposition, but Paley was eager to proceed, according to Halberstam, and made the initial arrangements for CBS with AT&T himself.

Despite the early strategy of the TV Plans Board and the alleged support of Paley, the Abilene speech was a notable failure. The General had to speak in a driving rain and delivered his announcement in a halting, uninspired manner as rain cascaded off a nearby umbrella onto his glasses. The next day's press conference went just as poorly. Print journalists tried to bar television cameras from the Abilene movie house. Finally, David Schoenbrun of CBS was allowed in as a pool reporter, but had to broadcast live with no return circuit from New York.

Some time later, evaluating kinescopes of the Abilene press conference, the TV Plans Board concluded nonetheless that the large, televised press conference was an effective technique for Eisenhower. The group reported to Sherman Adams that the candidate was at his best when he could face questioners. Prepared speeches were "deadly," it said, for they provided "no action."[30] The planning board also recommended that, when possible, questions be screened and answers prepared beforehand. When prepared speeches were to be used,

Eisenhower was to read them before or after the telecast, because "prepared speeches are TV sedatives."[31]

The Board suggested that more women make television appearances on behalf of Eisenhower, "particularly on the afternoon shows," and advocated the use of blacks and labor leaders as spokespersons.[32] It rejected a televised debate between Eisenhower and Stevenson for the reason that "Stevenson would automatically gain from co-billing with Eisenhower. Their marquee value is decidedly disproportionate."[33]

Additionally, the Board urged that Eisenhower be seen more frequently "on locale"; one report argued that Ike was more compelling out of a studio and away from a rostrum: "He becomes fully alive and intensely appealing when he reacts to people." Further, the Board told the campaign director that the questioners did not have to be reporters, a tactic used repeatedly by Richard Nixon's campaign planners in structuring that candidate's television appearances in the 1968 campaign.[34] Ideas for location outings in 1952 included a visit by the candidate to a nuclear power plant for a discussion of his position on atomic energy, and a dialogue with voters on the meaning of citizenship, probably on the Boston Commons. The Board stated the need for "clockwork arrangements" during Eisenhower's airport arrivals so that full coverage by local television stations could be arranged:

> The added attractions of Eisenhower meeting local personages (mayor, labor leader, industrialist, Grange head, etc.) and a short, terse ten to fifteen minute speech will offer programming that each local station will attempt to carry as public service sustainers. Such local coverage is a 'must' even if it's necessary to buy time. 35

The TV Plans Board also functioned behind the scenes in arranging Eisenhower's role at the Republican convention. (Jack Burns of the

Board meanwhile attended the convention as a representative of NBC-TV.) Before the convention, the group collected information about the planned television coverage and evaluated what they knew as it related to Eisenhower. This included the presentation by NBC to Philco of its planned coverage.[36] "Some of our people wrote the presentation," Halsey Barrett said when interviewed in 1981.[37] "TV Operations" for Eisenhower at the convention were also under the aegis of the Board. One recommendation was for the placement in the convention hall of a 30-by-40 foot television screen. The Board noted that "even with equal coverage, Ike will gain immense advantage due to his great telegenic superiority."[38] The Board was ahead of its time in this instance, for it turned out that a giant screen was technically unfeasible in 1952. All personnel involved in covering the convention--from sponsors, advertising agencies, and networks--were catalogued.

In Chicago, Eisenhower supporters at the convention were given straw hats with the bold letters, "IKE," pasted on the crowns. The TV Plans Board developed the straw hat idea, and approached the association in New York City that represented the hat industry. The industry group in turn donated more than 800 hats. At the convention, members of the Plans Board distributed the hats to delegates during a recess. Halsey Barrett recalls the pandemonium that followed:

> When the delegates came back, it was the funniest thing. They started to look at (the hats), and look at the sizes, and then they were exchanging sizes and grabbing them. And the cameras really picked it up, because that was the only thing going on. Even the Taft delegates were grabbing them.[39]

In its next issue, Newsweek reported the straw-hat gimmick, and judged it a "political trick aimed at TV."[40] The photograph accompanying the article made the point, of course, that the trick worked.

The influence of television at the Republican convention has been examined elsewhere.[41] As the result of careful preparation, Eisenhower's campaign team was well equipped to deal with the medium. Sig Mickelson, who produced the CBS coverage of the convention, has observed that Robert Taft's campaign advisers did not fully anticipate the impact of television.

> The Eisenhower people, however, knew precisely what they wanted to do. Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, understood or was guessing pretty well what television would mean.[42]

Mickelson says the image projected at the convention of Eisenhower supporters was of young, progressive Republicans contending with the "old-line, arch-conservative" Taft element which had controlled the party for years.[43] To underscore that portrait, Mickelson adds, the campaign was designed "with everything planned to attract attention on television."[44]

The TV Plans Board was certainly engaged in that process, both before and after the convention, and sometimes in ways that would be most unlikely today. As part of the effort to persuade Eisenhower to run, Senator Lodge and others made appearances on television programs, among them "Talent Scouts," "Godfrey and Friends," and Kate Smith's "Cracker Barrel." These appearances were coordinated by the planning board, and followed a prearranged scenario. The guest would at some point in the program ask the audience for a demonstration of support for General Eisenhower in the form of a postcard with the individual's name and address and a three-word message: "I Like Ike." The postcards were mailed to Eisenhower-for-President in Washington. Lodge made the appeal as well on the "Camel News Caravan."[45]

After the convention, the Plans Board continued to generate what were called "storylines," staged situations which were intended to create pro-Eisenhower impressions. For example, an impressionist was contacted,

helped with developing an Eisenhower skit, and booked on a network program. An amateur songwriter who had composed a campaign song had it entered for him on the program "Songs for Sale." The storylines were developed at the same time as a major effort was being conducted to "enlist members of the TV industry" as Eisenhower supporters.

The minutes of the TV Plans Board indicate that the cultivation of support within the industry was an important reason for the group's existence. It is not clear, though, if this support was meant to be entirely covert. File cards were prepared for producers, directors, writers, and performers. Individuals were later contacted personally and, before the General's announcement of candidacy, asked if they would be willing to sign an "Ike petition." ("First results," the minutes reported, "indicate that this job can be done on the phone very well." By the end of January, 1952, a majority of network producers and directors had been contacted by phone.)[46] This "recruiting" (the term used by the Plans Board) also consisted of "very low pressure" direct mailings.[47] The first mailing was of a blotter with Eisenhower's picture and a campaign button attached. An "Ike pin" exclusively for members of the television industry was distributed. The recruiting apparently got results. When one producer of the "Today" program was contacted, she reportedly said, "Feed me anything on Ike and I'll see that it's used."[48]

Members of the Plans Board say now such comments are easily misinterpreted, and that the Board was only providing network programs with guests they were interested in having on the air in the first place. Moreover, Board members see nothing improper about their role as advisors to Eisenhower. "We were doing something that was perfectly legitimate on our own time," Murray Gross said, "and did it in such a way that the

company or companies didn't get involved. . . . Today it would be taken out of context completely." Halsey Barrett emphasized that "there was no personal aggrandizement involved. . . . We didn't want to get entangled for our own skins, and we didn't want to implicate our position as employees." A third member said there was never any thought that the Board's activities might be improper: "One of our tenets was that we would never do anything that would be negative to the opposition. This always had to be positive, directly for Eisenhower."[49]

The TV Plans Board may have played a part in salvaging the vice presidential campaign of Richard Nixon--and thus his career. Eisenhower was urged by several key aides--and by editorials in the Washington Post and New York Herald Tribune--to drop Nixon from the ticket when it was revealed that the California Senator had been the beneficiary of an $18,235 political expense fund. Nixon writes in his memoirs that he was persuaded by Governor Dewey to take his case to the public in a television speech.[50] Dewey is quoted as saying, "All the fellows in New York agree with me." The TV Plans Board had earlier recommended, in the words of Halsey Barrett, that "If you want to save Nixon, the only way you can do it is with the power and speed of television."[51] It is not certain whether Dewey acted on the direct advice of the Board, but the "Checkers" speech on September 23, 1952, revived the Nixon candidacy.

Television Advertising and the Republican National Committee

The efforts of the Eisenhower campaign to use television to its best effect extended well beyond the TV Plans Board. The central campaign

plan was drafted by Robert Humphreys, the public relations director of the Republican National Committee and a former national affairs editor of Newsweek. Television was given a high priority in the plan, the first strategic document of its kind in an American presidential campaign. It called for the utilization of media to accentuate the "warmth of personality" of both Eisenhower and Nixon.[52]

Humphreys suggested that major campaign speeches be televised. The productions were to be intimate where possible, and "addressed directly to the individual American and his family, their problems and their hopes."[53] Along much the same line, an advertising campaign by BBD&O sought, according to agency president Bernard C. Duffy, to "merchandise Eisenhower's frankness, honesty and integrity, his sincere and wholesome approach."[54] Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon, a volunteer group which claimed to have 250,000 active workers, worked with two advertising agencies--Young & Rubicam and Ted Bates and Company--in preparing radio and television shows.

The Republicans devoted much of their paid-media effort to radio and television spot announcements, concentrated in the last weeks of the campaign. Rosser Reeves, a partner in Ted Bates and Company, was instrumental in conceiving and producing commercials which showed Eisenhower responding frankly and in simple language to the concerns of average citizens. In 1956, Business Week reported that the Republicans' "blitz" of thirty-second radio and television commercials cost the Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon campaign organization about $1.5 million over a three-week period.[55]

Over the last eight weeks of the campaign, the Republican National Committee was responsible for producing one national telecast per week, with each of the programs simulcast on radio. These were called "spearhead" broadcasts; they were usually half an hour in length and sometimes were

paired with fifteen-minute films which had been prepared in advance. The films followed two patterns.

> (A) A weekly 'newsreel' made up of shots taken of campaign activities, candidates speaking, greeting crowds, riding through throngs, etc. This would serve two purposes. It would show TV listeners the popularity of the candidate. It would highlight the important statements made during the week.
>
> (B) Intimate shots of the candidate 'at work.' These would be 'eavesdropping' shots on conferences and consultations in which candidates are not speaking but planning speeches or defining policies. This permits showing candidates in completely informal settings and gives people a 'behind the scenes' look at how they think--more convincing in some ways than set speeches.56

The television aspect of the campaign culminated in a one-hour election eve simulcast, produced by Arthur Pryor of BBD&O at a cost of about $267,000.[57] The program was constructed to be newsreel-like in tone, with as few professional actors and "staged acts" as possible.[58] Instead, the viewer saw a series of tightly edited film sequences: from the Korean War to Eisenhower's home in Abilene; from a prayer at a Los Angeles "Coffee for Eisenhower" to a child who had organized "Tykes for Ike." The program ended with Dwight and Mamie Eisenhower cutting a victory cake.

Eisenhower's resounding electoral victory the next day--and subsequent research into voting patterns in the 1952 campaign--indicate that Ike and Mamie would have shared a victory cake even without the expensive, elaborate, and frequently secret use of television. Indeed, one study found that persons who relied most heavily on television were more likely to vote Democratic.[59] Lang and Lang conclude that Eisenhower won the 1952 election before the campaign began.[60] The candidate at the center of the media effort was, after all, the most admired living American, according to a Roper poll in March, 1952.[61]

Conclusion

The significance of television planning in the 1952 Eisenhower campaign has less to do with the outcome of the election than with the union of television and politics on a national stage. The attempt to mobilize the new medium on Eisenhower's behalf may have been an overreaction in scope. But the activities of the TV Plans Board suggest that the media strategy of the 1952 campaign was more than a distant forerunner of that in Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign, when televised images of the candidate were so carefully manipulated. Halsey Barrett believes the Eisenhower campaign was far-sighted in its use of television: "We very clearly saw that television was the wave of the future. We sensed this from our commercial impact, and applied it to politics. We saw the big picture early."[62]

Making allowance for the technology available, one can say that the 1952 campaign was about as sophisticated as the Nixon campaign sixteen years later. It should be added that some of its tactics were just as dubious, though admittedly there were few ground rules for television journalism in 1952. With no precedents to draw upon, the networks allowed themselves, and their personnel, to be vulnerable to partisan manipulation. The election was a watershed in American politics of greater dimension than has been realized. It is now clear that in 1952, at the earliest moment possible, a national campaign was defined in terms of television.

-Notes-

1 See Erik Barnouw, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 295-303.

2 Transcript, Sig Mickelson Oral History Interview, September 13, 1979, Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, D.C.

3 Charles A. H. Thomson, Television and Presidential Politics (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 44.

4 See Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph T. Goldman, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952: The National Story (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954). Also see William C. Spragens, The Presidency and the Mass Media in the Age of Television (Washington: University Press of America, 1978) and Eugene H. Roseboom and Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., A History of Presidential Elections (New York: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 217-29.

5 The campaign's use of television in advertising and public relations is examined in Stanley Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). Also see Melvyn H. Bloom, Public Relations and Presidential Campaigns (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973). Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang summarize the effects literature in Politics and Television (Chicago: Quandrangle Books, 1968), pp. 12-35.

6 Thomson, op. cit., p. 20. Also see Herbert R. Craig, "Distinctive Features of Radio-TV in the 1952 Presidential Campaign" (unpublished master's thesis, University of Iowa, 1954), p. 125.

7 The Kudner Agency and BBD&O worked with the Republican National Committee. Young & Rubicam and Ted Bates and Company were employed by Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon.

8 Sigurd Larmon to Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 18, 1952, p. 1, William E. Robinson Papers, Box 9, Sigurd Larmon Folder, Eisenhower Library.

9 Ibid., p. 4.

10 Ibid., p. 5.

11 A number of journalists interviewed Eisenhower during this period, on and off the record, and his comments to each of them were essentially the same. The statement that politics was a "sordid" affair was made to C.L. Sulzberger and is cited in A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954 (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 703. Also see Relman Morin, Dwight D. Eisenhower: A Gauge of Greatness (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 139, and Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 284.

12 Minutes of the TV Plans Board, December 17, 1951, p. 2, Thomas E. Stephens Records, Box 6, Folder on Republican National Committee 1952--Speakers Scheduled, Radio, TV, Eisenhower Library. Stephens was a close associate of Henry Cabot Lodge. At the time of the 1952 campaign, he was secretary of the New York State Republican Committee. He later served as Eisenhower's appointments secretary.

13 Ibid.

[14] The unnamed member is precently employed by one of the networks, and agreed to be interviewed if his name were not used.

[15] Interview with Halsey Barrett, Murray Gross, and another member of the TV Plans Board, New York City, April 6, 1981.

[16] Minutes of the TV Plans Board, op. cit., p. 1.

[17] Ibid.

[18] See Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 67.

[19] See Roseboom and Eckes, op. cit., p. 218.

[20] The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980), p. 265.

[21] Ibid., p. 264.

[22] Henry Cabot Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), p. 99.

[23] Minutes of the TV Plans Board, op. cit., January 7, 1952, p. 2.

[24] Ibid., January 14, 1952, p. 3.

[25] Eisenhower: Captive Hero (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), p. 137.

[26] "Welcome to Abilene" (Eisenhower Day Press Kit), June 4, 1952, William E. Robinson Papers, Box 8, Folder on Election of 1952 (Spring and Summer, 1952), Eisenhower Library.

27 Ibid.

28 Minutes of the TV Plans Board, op. cit., April 21, 1952, p. 1.

29 David Halberstam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 231.

30 Minutes of the TV Plans Board, op. cit., September 22, 1952, p. 1.

31 Ibid., p. 2.

32 Ibid., p. 1

33 Meeting of August 18, 1952, p. 2.

34 Meeting of September 22, 1952, p. 1. See Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969).

35 Op. cit.

36 Meeting of January 7, 1952, p. 1.

37 Interview with TV Plans Board members, op. cit.

38 Op. cit., p. 2.

39 Op. cit.

40 "I Was There," July 21, 1952, p. 52.

41 In addition to Lang and Lang, op. cit., See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, "Television and the Election," Scientific American, 188:46-8 (May 1953). Also see Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower," Public Opinion Quarterly, 17:443-60 (Winter 1953-54).

42 Sig Mickelson Oral History Interview, op. cit., April 14, 1979.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Minutes of the TV Plans Board, op. cit., December 17, 1951, p. 4.

46 Meeting of January 21, 1952, p. 1.

47 Ibid.

48 Meeting of January 14, 1952, p. 1.

49 Interview with TV Plans Board members, op. cit.

50 RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 97. According to Nixon, Dewey advised him to remain on the ticket if public response to the television appearance was 90% positive. If the response was only 60% positive, Dewey urged him to withdraw. In either event, the decision would not be "blamed on Ike."

51 Op. cit.

52 "Campaign Plan," Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 8, Folder on 1952--Campaign and Election, p. 13, Eisenhower Library.

53 Ibid.

54 "Admen Analyze the Campaign Strategy," Tide, November 7, 1952, p. 15. Cited by Kelley, op. cit., p. 156.

55 "Madison Avenue's Hand in Politics," Business Week, June 30, 1956, p. 95.

56 "Outline of Radio-TV Activities," Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 8, Folder on 1952--Campaign and Election, Radio and TV, pp. 2-3, Eisenhower Library.

57 Kelley, op. cit., p. 193.

58 Ibid.

59 Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, op. cit. That television did not play a significant part in electoral behavior was also the finding of Herbert A. Simon and F. Stern in "The Effect of Television Upon Voting Behavior in Iowa in the 1952 Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 49:470-78.

60 Politics and Television. op. cit., p. 13.

61 Louis Harris, Is There a Republican Majority? (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 56.

62 Interview with TV Plans Board members, op. cit.